paul j. griffiths

Is it contradictory to deny creaturehood of any particular being, where ‘creaturehood’ means ‘having been brought into being ex nihilo by God’? To think that it is would be to make creaturehood essential to every being. To think that it is not would be to make creaturehood contingent to at least some beings. The latter view seems to me both false and incompatible with the grammar of the Christian faith, which understands each being as necessarily a creature. I was surprised, therefore, to find the view canvassed — though not, so far as I could tell, coherently so — by some Thomists at last weekend’s (13-15 November 2009) meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Society in New Orleans. The matter is important because (inter alia) on decision about it hinges the meaningfulness of talk about beings separated from talk about creatures.